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“Practice” Approaches and the Ethnography of Communication:
Investigating for the Possibility of a
Mutually Beneficial Relationship
Keith Berry
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale, Illinois, USA
In this essay, I explore areas of accord and discord between two efficacious
modes of research: “practice” approaches and the Ethnography of
Communication (EOC). As an interpersonal and intercultural scholar, I carefully
analyze these approaches in order to find innovative ways to describe the
diversity that I see in modern social interaction. Working against paradigms that
suggest using “either” one approach “or” another, I engage this project hoping
(expecting?) to find “and/both” alternatives for communication study. I argue
that, in spite of their differences, practice and EOC traditions co-exist in a
“mutually beneficial relationship” for the study of communication. Key words:
Ethnography of Communication, Practice Approaches, Ethnography, Pluralist
Research, and Qualitative Methods.

There are many different ways to study human behavior. How do I make sense of two
viable approaches to the study of interpersonal and cultural communication? In what ways does
the description of social “practices” relate to the research interests of the Ethnography of
Communication (EOC)? Is this a relation of connection, distance, or both? As a scholar who is
interested in maximizing, rather than reducing, the layers of understanding available in
qualitative research, I pursue answers to these questions in this essay.
In my research experience, I primarily use phenomenology and ethnography to study the
intrinsic connection between communication, culture, and identity. These scholarly traditions
stress heavy description of communicative phenomena, an emphasis that compels me to
foreground contingency in varying degrees. We can never fully describe all that we experience.
Therefore, rather than seeking “closure, certainty, and control” (Stewart, 1991, p. 356), I assume
that communication research is more “partial, partisan, and problematic” (Goodall, 2000, p. 55;
see also Eisenberg and Goodall, Chapter 2). There will always be alternate ways of describing
communication.
Working from an assumption of contingency involves numerous opportunities to
categorize with binaries. I frequently must answer whether phenomena are “personal” or
“political,” or whether “micro-” or “macro-“ social phenomena influence communication, etc. I
make choices between research approaches. For example, I chose hermeneutic phenomenology
over standard rhetorical criticism and written scholarship instead of staged performance. Once I
select an approach, I feel obliged to perform in some ways over others. For example, I write by
using more modernist and standard forms of representation instead of those that are more
postmodern and esoteric. This experience of choice within binaries is likely influenced by the
reality that many scholars assign greater “rigor” and “validity” to privileged approaches. A
comprehensive treatment of why we choose certain methods, and the subsequent complications
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of these choices, is beyond the scope of this essay. To be sure, endemic to research is some
aspect of choice and, to varying extents, a need to negotiate with binaries. This negotiation takes
many forms. Instead of foregrounding “either” practice approaches “or” EOC, I engage both in
one conversation to better understand their areas of accord and discord. There are a variety of
benefits related to this form of analysis.
First, my goal to analyze these approaches in tandem does not mean that I hope to find a
superior method for studying communication. Each has specific aspects that make the approach
more helpful than the other. However, I offer this essay as a model of how to constructively
study two research traditions with an overall goal of seeking connection, rather than distance.
Second, and similarly, I describe how such a connection might be performed. This enables an
understanding of the ways scholars can use these traditions to enrich each other. Thus, I suggest
communication research to be an open-minded search for possibilities, rather than a hostile,
mean-spirited critique.1 Next, this essay indirectly illustrates how qualitative research is pursued
as an outgrowth of researchers’ lived experience. For example, I am comfortable with practice
approaches (a tradition, incidentally, related to ethnomethodology and phenomenology) and
EOC because of my experiences of marginalization as a gay man. These approaches offer
avenues on which I analyze unique, everyday, often unvoiced ways of communication. Other
researchers will conduct different analyses that relate to their lived experience.2 This engages
communication scholars to be self-reflexive so that they can engage in personalized, meaningful
projects. Finally, I previously suggested that, in contrast to potentially constraining either/or
perspectives, the both/and assumption that guides this analysis makes available greater
possibilities for academic performance. On the basis that what we do powerfully shapes our
identities, exploring practice approaches and EOC in such a way affords more numerous options
for performance and being, both inside and outside our academic milieu.3
In this essay, I argue for a mutually beneficial relationship between practice approaches
and EOC. I first describe how Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodological position that
logical practices of human conduct shape everyday life informs EOC and practice scholarship.
Next, I describe practice arguments by Theodore L. Schatzki (2001b), Barry Barnes (2001), and
Stephen Turner (2001). These sociological perspectives vary in scope. However, each assumes
that exploring and respecifying generalized theoretical accounts are valuable scholarly moves. I
follow with a description of EOC, as founded by Dell Hymes (1967, 1968, 1972, 1974) and
expanded by Gerald Philipsen (1977, 1992) and Tamar Katriel (1986). This comparative research
tradition involves the study of contextually bound functions of particularized modes of
communication. Regarding the scope of this project, I could bring together any two or more
research approaches, whether they are similar or radically different. However, I select these
approaches because of their commitment to the qualitative study of diverse communicative
1

Calvin O. Schrag (1986) and Dennis K. Mumby (1997), among others, largely influence the first two benefits.
Each views the relationship between modernist and postmodernist research as existing on a continuum. Both
philosophical traditions offer valuable resources with which to describe human behavior. While these scholars
influence my performance as philosopher/cultural analyst, I do not propose that practice and EOC approaches
necessarily fall within modernism and postmodernism. Furthermore, I do not wish to argue that analysts who solely
employ one approach (rather than multiple) are “hostile” or less than earnest.
2
See Edmund Husserl’s (1954/1970) notion of the phenomenological “lifeworld” for a more detailed discussion of
the constitutive nature of lived experience.
3
See Schrag’s (1986) consideration of how “communicative praxis” implicates subjectivity. Also see Lenore
Langsdorf’s (2002) notion of “communicative poiesis” which suggests that, within the thoughtful doing of
communicative praxis, we perform and creatively make and remake ourselves.
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experience. Bringing them into dialogue increases the ways we can interpret and respect
diversity in communication style and identity. This embracing move extends the list of
previously mentioned benefits. What gets lost in my using similar approaches is the potential for
clash that would likely be found if I were to bring together blatantly disparate approaches (e.g.,
narrative and forms of statistical analyses).
I propose that EOC and practice perspectives intersect in these ways: they foreground the
importance of practices and the constitution of meaning within those practices, discuss practices
as collective action, and emphasize “neutral,” non-evaluative description of social phenomena. I
argue for a reciprocal relationship between the two approaches. On the one hand, inspired by
Donal Carbaugh and Sally Hastings’ (1992) “BASE” mnemonic for ethnographic research, I
contend that practice scholars enrich EOC scholarship. Turner’s (2001) consideration of
heterogeneous lessons offers an alternative approach to EOC that enables the researcher to
examine idiosyncratic communicative experiences that reside within the shared experiences of a
speech community (Hymes, 1967). Additionally, Schatzki’s (2001b) notion of “teleoaffectivity”
encourages a more fluid, changing emphasis on communities’ communication styles. On the
other hand, EOC provides an exemplar with which practice theorists can concretize their
theoretical perspectives in situated cultural “scenes” (Carbaugh, 1996).
Garfinkel’s Mundane Practices
Garfinkel (1967) proposes a radical approach to the study of human conduct. He
foregrounds the contingency of “practical activities [and] practical circumstances” by giving “the
most commonplace activities of daily life the attention usually accorded extraordinary events”
(p. 1). The author writes, “I use the term ‘ethnomethodology’ to refer to the investigation of the
rational properties of indexical expressions and other practical actions as contingent ongoing
accomplishments” (p. 11). Thus, ethnomethodology entails primarily focusing on the logic and
purposes behind mundane phenomena (statements and actions) “in their own right” (p. 1). For
example, ethnomethodologists might examine the social practices of elevator passengers, or
baseball game attendees, to examine what purposes their communication serves.
Garfinkel’s (1967) emphasis on practical, mundane activities identifies what he views as
a void in research on social order. He finds value in examining the “unexamined”; that is, “the
socially standardized and standardizing, ‘seen but unnoticed,’ expected, background features of
everyday scenes” (p. 36). These “background” phenomena serve as “scheme[s]” of
interpretation” (p. 36). It would seem to follow that to study background expectancies is to
explore the ways in which individuals interpret their everyday experiences.
“9/11,” and the more recent United States military action, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” are
effective illustrations of background assumptions. It is hard to miss the passionate, yet often
uncritically examined, performances of “patriotism” related to these events. A closer look at the
functions of commonplace pro-war interpersonal communication and mass communication
messages shows how this communication constitutes an influential background narrative—a
“seen but unnoticed” interpretive lens—through which communicators organize human behavior.
In effect, this background narrative renders possible social interactions in which individuals who
have differing paradigms (e.g., those who are opposed to war, or problem solving through
violence) are tacitly and actively responded to as being “less patriotic,” “unpatriotic,” or even
“traitorous.”
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In his discussion of Agnes’ rigorous, traumatic practice of being a “natural” woman,
Garfinkel (1967) proposes a method rooted in detailed, non-evaluative description of the “actual
appearance” (p. 78) of social practices. Scholars wishing to examine everyday activities, or, in
his terms, “organized artful practices” (p. 34), can begin by studying “familiar scenes and ask
what can be done to make trouble” (p. 37). Making trouble, in this sense, makes the rules of
everyday practices visible. These rules guide what, how, and when communication should occur.
There are several implications of Garfinkel’s (1967) argument that are particularly
relevant to this essay. First, he implies an emphasis on practice over theory. He also suggests that
social order is patterned and human activity is practical. It is open to description and, in turn,
ongoing interpretation. Each of these issues will play a role in my search for a “mutually
beneficial” connection between practice theory and EOC. I begin by describing both approaches.
A “Practice” Approach
[T]he prominence of practical understanding underwrites the proposition that the
maintenance of practices, and thus the persistence and transformation of social life, rests
centrally on the successful inculcation of shared embodied know-how. (Schatzki, 2001a, p.
3)

Practice theorists, such as Schatzki (2001a), study communicators’ logical, “bundled
activities” often as a means of respecifying “general and abstract [theoretical] account[s]” (p. 3).
He argues, “A central core . . . of practice theorists conceives of practices as embodied,
materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical
understanding” (p. 2). In other words, practice scholars focus on the ways in which
communicators (verbally and somatically) enact activities in order to accomplish things. This
approach, Schatzki (2001a) holds, entails theory that “departs from both the once dominant
conception that ties theory to explanation and prediction and the more colloquial and still
prevalent notion that theories are hypotheses” (p. 4). Thus, practice theory attempts to describe,
rather than control, situated social phenomena.
He suggests that practice research is a field without unification. And yet, two common
areas of interest include examining the ways in which social order is constituted in social
interaction (e.g., rules, tacit knowledge) and the relationship between micro- and macro-social
phenomenon (social interaction and societal influences respectively) and social order. I focus on
theoretical perspectives of Schatzki (2001b), Barnes (2001), and Turner (2001) and their
considerations of social order as constituted within practices.
“Social orders,” according Schatzki (2001b), “are arrangements of people and of the
artifacts, organisms, and things through which they coexist, in which these entities relate and
possess identity and meaning” (p. 53). Practices, or the “context of social order” (p. 54), are
“organized nexuses of activity” (p. 48). Social orders then are constituted “within the sway of
social practices” in which “teleoaffective structure” (p. 42) is central:
[Teleoaffectivity entails] a range of acceptable or correct ends, acceptable or correct tasks
to carry out for these ends, acceptable or correct beliefs (etc.) given which specific tasks
are carried out for the sake of these ends, and even acceptable or correct emotions out of
which to do so…. [I]t is by virtue of expressing certain understandings, rules, ends,
projects, beliefs, and emotions (etc.) that behaviors form an organized manifold. (p. 5253)
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In other words, the teleoaffective structures with which individuals engage in everyday activities
influence those practices. In Schatzki’s (2001b) sense, social practices entail practical activities
related to individuals’ “ongoing involvement with the world” (p. 49).
Schatzki’s (2001b) assertion leads me to consider my work with a high school speech
team, whose members often refer to themselves as “speechies.” I believe that speechie
interpersonal practices, such as demonstrating tremendous amounts of support in times of
competition, not taking jokes from fellow speechies personally, and expressing themselves via
creative, unique ways, function to construct a social order characterized by acceptance and
achievement. Speechies engage these social practices (“tasks”) with respect to their desire to
achieve the “ends” of the social order. In line with Schatzki (2001b), both the “ends” and
“means,” are open to speechies’ “ongoing involvement” (p. 49) within their social processes.
Barnes (2001) argues that “shared practices” constitute social order (p. 22). He states,
“What is required to understand a practice of this kind is not individuals oriented primarily by
their own habits, nor is it individuals oriented by the same collective object; rather it is human
beings oriented to each other” (p. 24, emphasis in original). While individual habits have
provisional relevance, Barnes (2001) emphasizes that social order is a “collective
accomplishment” (p. 23). Thus, he argues, “Let practices be socially recognized forms of
activity, done on the basis of what members learn from others, and capable of being done well or
badly, correctly or incorrectly” (p. 19).
College students often engage in particular kinds of shared practices. Consider the
scenario where students are inactive in classroom discussions. For me, these moments typically
include teachers asking questions of their classes. This practice is often followed by a pause;
some pauses are dreadfully longer than others. I have been on the teacher and student ends of this
hesitation. My experience as a student taught me that if we allow a long enough pause to persist
in between question and answer, teachers would likely fill the gap with something. In this
particular shared practice, which admittedly probably varies depending on teacher, class, and
difficulty of question, students co-construct the climate of the classroom. Silence may mean that
no one knows the answer, or perhaps, that no one wishes to actively participate in discussion. By
not responding to questions, students create a sort of tension. In turn, they create the need for
teachers to “rescue” them from the silence.
Alternatively, students might co-construct a freer flowing, less tense classroom climate.
This practice might occur when students demonstrate noticeable signs of listening to one another
by nodding their heads and answering with statements that seem to cohere with the conversation.
In turn, students might “turn take” in order to not interrupt their colleagues. Certainly, active
listening and turn taking are phenomena that are likely to be culturally relevant. This is not the
point of my example. My point is that Barnes’ (2001) conception of shared practices takes a
variety of shapes and forms, with varying modes of expression and desired purposes.
Discussing social rules, Turner (2001) argues against the notion of shared practices,
refutes scholarship that favors the influence of implicit social rules, and calls for a “throwing out
the tacit rule book” (p. 120). He argues, “The experience of social life, in the absence of a
massive amount of information or of highly structured experiences, is simply too diverse, and too
thin, for the individual to derive from it anything so determinate as a set of rules that is the same
for everyone” (p. 129). In other words, the diverse nature of social life decreases the likelihood
of communicators operating based on implicit rules. To claim that communicators function from
tacit knowledge is to imply their homogeneity. In contrast, Turner (2001) writes,
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[T]he problem is to figure out … the kinds of patterns and regularities we regard as social
practices are nothing more than that which people learn, in a rather heterogeneous way,
are the best ways or the satisfactory ways to negotiate the paths toward the fulfillment of
whatever purposes they might have. (p.129-130)
Moments of my family life illustrate Turner’s (2001) thesis. Until somewhat recently, my
memories of religion have always been interconnected with Catholicism. I was baptized as an
infant, attended catechism classes, and went to a Catholic high school. Even to this date, I have
not declared myself as Buddhist, or at least a non-Catholic who has an affinity for Eastern
perspectives, to my parents. One argument could be that my non-disclosure is influenced by a
presumed tacit rule that the Berry family is Catholic. My grandparents from my father’s side of
the family are Catholic. Without explicit discussion, then, practicing Catholicism is simply
something that my family seems to do. No one in my family has explicitly stated that our family
is and should be Catholic.
Complicating this argument is Turner’s (2001) position against the notion of tacit rules. I,
together with my sister, have viewpoints about religion that differ from those our parents. Put
simply, we had never expected to remain Catholic once we became adults. Furthermore, I would
imagine that my mother, reared Protestant and later converted to Catholicism, does not function
from the same “rules” about religion as does my father (a life-long Catholic). Thus, it seems
likely that, although we do not explicitly state our divergent (“heterogeneous”) viewpoints of
“rules,” nor do we demonstrate our diverse practices of religion, the Berry family enters the
practice of religion with “heterogeneous lessons” that prevent one from arguing with clear
conscience that tacit rules drive our religion practices.
Practice approaches, along with Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology, explicitly
foreground practices over broad, theoretical claims about human conduct. Practice theorists hold
that to understand human conduct better, scholars should explore the social practices that
constitute our lives (Schatzki, 2001a).
The Ethnography of Communication
Dell Hymes founded the Ethnography of Speaking (EOS) to fill a gap in research
between anthropology and linguistics (Saville-Troike, 1989). Addressing what he sees as a
commonly held assumption that speech is more homogeneous than heterogeneous, Hymes
(1968) argues: “The speech of a group constitutes a system,” “speech and language vary crossculturally in function,” and “the speech activity of a community is the primary object of
attention” (p. 132). In other words, speech “does” things in diverse, pervasive ways. EOS—later
named the Ethnography of Communication (EOC), in part, to incorporate non-linguistic cultural
phenomena—is a “comparative study of the patterning and functions of speech” (Hymes, 1968,
p. 133) that allows scholars to explore and descriptively analyze “situations and uses, the patterns
and functions, of speaking in its own right” (p.101).
EOC scholars seek first to particularize findings to a localized speech community and
only eventually work toward establishing a generalized metatheory of communication by
comparing and contrasting particularized ways of speaking (Saville-Troike, 1989). Scholars
immerse themselves in a field; “jot” various observations on communicative phenomena, and
interview members of a speech community about what the researchers observed (Saville-Troike,
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1989).4 Finally, EOC is an emic-based research (Pike, 1967) process that entails a middle ground
between “rigid linearity and deliberate nonlinearity in research design” (Philipsen, 1977, p 45)
and serves as a cyclical heuristic approach through which to develop interpersonal
communication theory (Carbaugh & Hastings, 1992).
“Shared Knowledge” of a Speech Community
In this essay, I use Hymes (1967) notion of a speech community5 to consider ways
communicators co-construct meaning. Although he has reservations about ascertaining a “single
general definition” (p. 19), Hymes “tentatively define[s] the basic notion of speech community in
terms of shared knowledge of rules for the interpretation of speech, including rules for the
interpretation of at least one common code” (p. 19, emphasis in original). In other words, a
speech community is a group of communicators with joint knowledge for ways of
communicating and the meaning of communication. The emphasis on “shared” guidelines for the
conduct of, and meanings of, communicative behavior suggests that communication within
speech communities is more a collective, rather than solely an individual, process.
Two relevant examples come to mind. First, the Speech Communication (SPCM)
department (both graduate students and faculty) at my university is an example of a speech
community. We have “shared knowledge” of the notion of tolerant communication. Using racial
slurs, or those directed at sexual minorities would likely be interpreted as intolerant, disrespectful
and, thus, inappropriate communication in our community. Thus, individual members of this
community are likely to perceive slurs negatively and avoid using them, at least when with
fellow members of the community. Secondly, the speechies with whom I have studied constitute
a speech community. Based on the observation and interview data I collected, it is evident that
many speechies have shared knowledge about what it means to use the word speechie and how a
speechie typically communicates. While many individuals stray from the cultural norm, they
generally know that being a speechie largely entails communicating with openness, humor, and
support.6
Hymes (1967) accounts for the possibility of idiosyncratic ways of speaking within a
speech community: “There may be more than one language of the home, each linking the family
in a different direction (p. 13) […] Not all of these codes will be intelligible to all members of a
community [ . . .]” (p. 18). Elsewhere, he argues, “If several dialects or languages are in use, all
are considered together as part of the speech activity of the group” (Hymes, 1968, p. 108). The
chance for the intolerant communicator in the SPCM community, and the speech team member
who uses the term speechie inappropriately, or communicates in ways contrary to speechie ways,
4

For additional information on fieldwork and interview processes, see the work of Charles L. Briggs (1986), Martyn
Hammersley and Paul Atkinson (1995), Robert Emerson, Rachel Fretz, and Linda Shaw (1995), and John Lofland
and Lyn Lofland (1995).
5
I use Hymes’ speech community specifically to highlight the notion of a sharing of rules for conduct and
interpretation. See J. Gumperz (1962) and R.J. Hans Dua (1981) for alternative views and challenges to the notion of
speech community.
6
Over the course of three years and three seasons of speech competition, I have spent over 150 hours in the “field”
with these students. This often takes place while they practice for competition and more often while they are at the
competitions themselves. This research is ongoing and contributes to my dissertation.
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would exemplify idiosyncrasy in communication style. These distinct ways of communicating
exist within the often more noticeable communal ways.
Despite idiosyncratic behaviors within speech communities, I believe that EOC cogently
explicates the ways in which groups of communicators co-construct meaning. This is evident in
the work of Philipsen (1992) and Katriel (1986) (among others). I follow by offering a sketch of
select works from these authors to better understand EOC and Hymes’ influence on the situated
analysis of cultural communication.
Philipsen (1992) describes communication in “Teamsterville,” a working class
neighborhood on the near southwest side of Chicago. More particularly, he explains how the
perception of neighborhood shapes “Teamsterville” practices.
Philipsen argues, “[A]
Teamsterviller’s sense of neighborhood is a lens through which he [or she] locates speech,
socially, physically, and hierarchically. ‘The neighborhood’ is the most macroscopic concept that
Teamstervillers use to distinguish places in general from places for speaking” (p. 35).
He further suggests that the physical boundaries of the neighborhood are “coextensive
with a particular style of speaking, which is characteristic of the community and to which, its
residents should conform” (pp. 31-32). Thus, there is an “unusually strong relationship of social
to physical place” (p. 33). That is, “speech is seen as an instrument of sociability with one’s
fellows, as a medium for asserting communal ties and loyalty to a group, and serves—by its use
or disuse, or by the particular manner of its use—to signal that one knows one’s place in the
world” (p. 42). Thus, the ways in which one communicates in Teamsterville speaks to her/his
being an “insider” or “outsider.”
Katriel (1986) describes the Israeli Sabra “dugri speech,” a way of speaking rich in
history, tradition, and (like Teamstervillers) cultural identity. Sabra culture sought to renew a
“Jewish life in the land of Israel as the historical bedrock of the Jewish people” (p. 17). She adds,
“The New Jew… was to prefer clear-cut deeds to mere words, clarity of purpose coupled with
simplicity and a nonmanipulative openness of expression, rather than a debilitating sensitivity to
the complexity of issues and to external pressures” (p. 18).
Dugri speech then is a communication style personified by an “accent of sincerity” (p.
21) and “attitude of ‘antistyle’” (p. 24). Sabra culture views “dugri” as an “antistyle” because of
the ways that members’ directness contrasts with Zionist preaching of the past that used
“dramatic language and high-flown expressions” (p. 25). The “plain talk” nature of dugri speech,
Katriel (1986) maintains, “is not the absence of style but rather an alternative stylistic option” (p.
25).
Together, Philipsen (1992) and Katriel (1986) illustrate EOC scholarship that describes
situated theories of communication. One mode of examining such localized theories exists in
Carbaugh and Hastings’ (1992) “BASE” mnemonic (p. 163). They propose “four distinctive but
interrelated phases (or moments) of theorizing…each phase…like each stage above [their three
phases], provides a context for, and is itself contextualized by the others, though we present them
here in their logical, chronological sequence” (p.159). Phase one theorizing (“Basic Orientation”)
entails researchers questioning their assumptions about the character of communication. Phase
two theorizing (“Activity Theory”) moves from that general theorizing of communication (phase
one) to particular theories of communicative activity. Carbaugh and Hastings (1992) argue, “The
intent is to develop a conceptual system that informs one generally how to look (the basic
orientation), and identifies possible parameters of variability in what one might see (the activity
theories)” (p. 161). They propose a third phase (“Situated Theory”) focused on “the theory of the
case, the formulation of the general ways in which communication is patterned within a
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socioculturally situated community, field, or domain” (p. 161). In other words, this takes the
above mentioned general theories of communication and explores how these notions are “done”
in particular cultural contexts. Finally, phase four theorizing (“Evaluation and/or Evolution of
Theory”) entails researchers taking localized communicative theory (developed in phase three)
and using it to re-examine the broader theoretical perspectives of phases one and two: “By
reflecting upon the lens used to conduct the ethnography (the basic/activity theory), and critically
assessing its use (through situated theory), the lens itself is refined, developed, and/or validated,
even, though rarely, discarded” (p.162).
Of the four phases, I am especially interested in the possibility that the final, “evaluation”
phase of ethnographic research accommodates “enrichment” by practice scholarship. For
instance, in past research experiences that explored members of a particular speech community’s
use of “politeness,” I conducted observations and interviews and, consequently, found that the
situated theory I proposed about this community questioned the efficacy of Brown and
Levinson’s (1987) notion of a universal “politeness” (Berry, 2002). Therefore, the “evaluation”
phase seems useful to my own EOC scholarship. I will provide more detail as to the usefulness
of Carbaugh and Hastings’ (1992) model below. With an introductory understanding of both
approaches in place, we can now discuss their similarities.
Toward A Connection
Schatzki (2001b), Barnes (2001), and Turner (2001) offer theoretical perspectives about
practices. EOC provides theory along with situated accounts of communicative behavior. I
believe that practice theory and EOC scholarship intersect in three aspects: their focus on
practices; the importance of shared action; and an emphasis on non-evaluative, detailed
descriptions of phenomena.
First, both emphasize practices. Schatzki (2001a) proposes that practices are “bundled
activities” (p. 3), or “embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized
around shared practical understanding” (p. 2). In his discussion of cultural “ways of speaking,”
Hymes (1974) asserts that a speech community is comprised of “a set of styles…a way or mode
of doing something…any way or mode…all ways and modes” (p. 434). Both approaches seek to
move beyond what Schatzki (2001a) argues is “general and abstract account[s]” (p. 3).
Most beneficial from the focus on practices is the way in which practice and EOC
theorists allow researchers to explore diverse types of phenomena and, similarly, diversity within
those phenomena. First, just as human beings do a multitude of things in their everyday lives,
scholars can examine a multitude of foci. Not constrained to ascertaining how generalized
communicative phenomena apply to all communicators, researchers can explore particular
contexts and, within those contexts, specific ethnicities, sexual orientations, religions, geographic
locations, etc. Second, both practice and EOC scholars imply, in Kenneth Pike’s (1967) sense,
emic oriented analyses of human conduct. This generally means that these approaches work
inductively rather than deductively. Because of this and, more specifically, because neither
purports to begin research with global, generalizing theories of human conduct, they both offer
scholars a chance to explore and report on diverse peoples and their practices.
Both approaches propose that something particularly significant takes place while
individuals are engaged in practices. Schatzki’s (2001a) assertion that practices are “organized
nexuses of activity” (p. 48) and, even more, his notion of “teleoaffective structure” (p. 50) tells
me that individuals “do” things (e.g., they “organize” or structure their experiences) that
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typically relate to what is practical for them in any given moment. Likewise, Barnes’ (2001)
position that social order is an accomplishment of social practices in which “members learn from
others” (p. 19) suggests that this learning must be about something. Indeed, there are inevitably
lessons that are less important, or more trivial than others. However, Schatzki (2001b) and
Barnes (2001) imply that there is “substance” to practices—that more often than not they hold
particular significance for the involved members. Easier to explain is EOC’s notion of
meaningfulness in practices. Following Hymes’ (1967) discussion of speech communities,
members have “shared knowledge.” Thus, the “something” meaningful in EOC practices is
communicative meaning. For example, there is particular meaning to the statement “I speak
Dugri” (Katriel, 1986) and to the Teamsterville male practice of not handling conflict with
physicality (Philipsen, 1992).
These examples of the meaningfulness of practices suggest an important component of
the practice approaches and EOC scholarship: meaning is largely a constituent of social
interaction rather than a reflection of representational influences. This is to say that individuals
engaged in practices construct meaning within the interaction.
A second main connection between these approaches is their position on shared action.
Schatzki’s (2001b) proposal that practices are “arrangements of people” who “coexist” and
“relate and possess identity and meaning” (p. 53), and Barnes’ (2001) assertion that social order
is a “collective accomplishment” (p. 23) that is enacted via communicators “oriented to each
other” (p. 24, italics in original) suggest that practices are not individualistic phenomena, devoid
of the contact with, and influence of, others. Instead, the actions of individuals engaged in
practices together construct varying components of a given social order. Philipsen (1992) and
Katriel (1986) find that members, rooted in their respective histories, engage in communicative
practices that constitute larger, more significant aspects of their lives (e.g., Teamsterville
solidarity and Israeli Sabra’s cultural ethos).
This agreement in the importance of shared practice carries with it the shared implication
that communication is a dynamic process. Communicators’ identities are diverse. Consequently,
we should expect similar diversity when they engage in communicative practices with others.
Turner’s (2001) position that individuals come to practices from heterogeneous lessons
influenced by their diverse lived experience further illustrates the likelihood that practices are
dynamic phenomena, affected by diverse participants. I will discuss the complication that
Turner’s (2001) thesis presents in terms of Hymes (1967) “shared knowledge” below.
A final connection between the two approaches relates to the ways in which researchers
discuss the phenomena they encounter. Practice and EOC scholars emphasize detailed, nonevaluative descriptions. Schatzki’s (2001a) assertion that practice theory “departs from both the
once dominant conception that ties theory to explanation and prediction” (p. 4) suggests that it is
possible to engage practice scholarship simply seeking to describe communicative phenomena I
observe. By non-evaluative, I do not mean neutral. Assuredly, I believe that my lived experience
influences how I research. Being non-evaluative, however, means approaching a research site
with an open mind, which entails not scrutinizing the communication I experience as being
“wrong,” “immoral,” “incompetent,” etc.
This emphasis on non-evaluation becomes easier (but surely not easy by any means) to
accomplish when I consider an inspiring overlap in terminology that I discovered while
preparing to write this essay. Garfinkel (1967) proposes that ethnomethodologists focus on
mundane phenomena “in their own right” (p. 1). Hymes (1968) asserts that EOC scholars should
study communication “in its own right” (p.101). It is clear that both approaches treat practice and
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communicative phenomena alone as efficacious foci of study. This foregrounding of
communicative activities entails privileging participants’ reports, which, in turn, involves
researchers using detailed descriptions of what they observe and hear in fieldwork and
interviews. For example, I find that the more detail I provide, the more I seem “true” to the
participants of my research and the less evaluative I am about their communication.
An Opening of Doors
In the foregoing discussion, I have attempted to make clear the similarity between
practice and EOC perspectives. These similarities center on aspects that I find to be critical to
research processes. They deal with questions such as: On what do I as researcher focus? What
counts as noteworthy in my investigation and why? What type of claims should I make as
researcher? These are summary questions based on the previous discussion, instead of questions
that need answering at this stage. While I see illuminating intersections between practice and
EOC approaches, I do not want to conflate the two, nor do I wish to imply that they are identical.
Rather, I believe Schatzki (2001b), Barnes (2001) and Turner (2001) can enrich EOC and vice
versa.
Using Practice Perspectives to Enrich EOC
Recall that Carbaugh and Hastings (1992) propose “four distinctive but interrelated
phases (or moments) of theorizing” (p. 159). In the fourth phase of theorizing (“Evaluation
and/or Evolution of Theory”) the scholars discuss how researchers take the localized
communicative theory developed in phase three (e.g., the ways in which Israeli Sabra culture
uses dugri speech) and use it to re-examine the broader theoretical perspectives of phases one
and two (e.g., the reexamination of politeness theory). Carbaugh and Hastings (1992) propose
that this phase allows the theoretical approach of the ethnographer to be “refined, developed,
and/or validated, even, though rarely, discarded” (p. 162). I use this logic as rationale for
suggesting that practice theory can enrich EOC. Specifically, I believe that, in addition to reexamining the theories that guide our ethnographic research, we can also attend specifically to
the situated theory just constructed. We can be excited about the localized accounts we describe
and, yet, be open to various tools with which we can examine those accounts for ways in which
to enrich them. I contend that practice approaches serve as examples of such tools.
Turner’s (2001) debunking of tacit rules, on the basis that practices, and the individuals
within practices, are “too diverse” (p. 129) to allow for them, reminds EOC researchers to
explore the idiosyncratic within their observation and interview practices. This argument affirms
and enriches EOC. On the one hand, EOC scholars conduct participant observation and interview
research (Saville-Troike, 1989). In doing so, they examine explicit instances of talk, or, more
broadly, communication. Given this, it would seem that Turner’s (2001) position concurs with
the EOC approach: EOC scholars describe specific instances without reliance upon tacit, or
implicit, rules.
On the other hand, Turner (2001) suggests that individuals with heterogeneous
experiences enact practices. This position does not “throw out” Hymes’ (1967) contention that
speech community members have “shared knowledge.” Instead, Turner (2001) inspires me to
both identify instances of “shared knowledge” that are made explicit through my fieldwork, but
also to subsequently re-explore speech communities for idiosyncratic communication and
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meanings within these communities. Granted, Hymes (1967; 1968) acknowledged the possibility
of diverse language, styles of communicating, etc. in speech communities. Yet, it seems to me
that so often what is foregrounded in EOC scholarship is the collective accomplishment rather
than the idiosyncratic voices of a speech community (Philipsen, 1992; Katriel, 1986). An
examination of the idiosyncratic would not only allow researchers the opportunity to explore
diversity within a community, but also to explore how this diversity might actually inform the
collective accomplishment. Perhaps ethnographers can incorporate analyses that focus on
divergent styles within a speech community.
Also, I believe that Schatzki’s (2001b) “teleoaffectivity” enriches my experience as an
EOC scholar; in particular, this notion suggests keeping an open mind in terms of the
malleability of communication styles. The author positions his discussion of “teleoaffective
structure” (p. 50) within individuals’ “ongoing involvement with the world” (p. 49). This points
to practices being temporal and, consequently, momentary or fleeting. While sedimented lived
experience plays a role, Schatzki (2001b) emphasizes that practices, like communication in
general, are fluid and changing.
In relation to EOC research, I think of occasions when I have analyzed (and also spoken
of) speechie communication as more static than fluid. For instance, I seem to rely heavily and, at
times, comfortably, on the belief that this self-identifying term has been in the past, and still
remains today, pervasive for this speech community. Granted, I believe that the data I collect
strengthens my claims. Yet, I wonder how the information I collect in future observations and
interviews might enhance, or dramatically change, what I believe now about the speechies.
Katriel (1986) discusses how the communication styles of her participants have changed
over time. For instance she compares current Israeli Sabra culture’s communication styles with
those of this group’s parent generation. Thus, Katriel (1986) serves as an exemplar for ways in
which I can discuss communication in flux. The ways in which I write EOC “write-ups” can
assist in accounting for change in communication styles. I can remember to rely on the data I
collect and, at the same time, write more provisionally so as to create the image of
communication experiences as changing rather than statically enduring.
This leads me to an important question: What if the data I collect illustrates a speech
community using communication styles that endure? What happens when, in a research process
that requires the emic-researcher to focus on the data in his/her descriptions, the data does not
reflect change as a result of, in Schatzki’s (2001b) sense, a speech community’s “ongoing
involvement with the world” (p. 49)? It seems reasonable to suggest that once I notice what I
think is a static quality to the communication described by participants, I can question them
specifically as to the ways in which they see change in their community’s communication. If my
fieldwork is complete, and I cannot return to the field, I can still rely on the data I have collected
and, in the process of writing provisionally; I can leave room for the possibility of change.
Using EOC to Enrich Practice Perspectives
Just as I argue that practice approaches can enhance EOC, prior to closing, I also offer
my suggestions as to how EOC can add to the studies of practices by centering on the efficacy of
localized theory and Hymes’ (1972) “SPEAKING” mnemonic.
Schatzki’s (2001a) telling of how practice theorists respecify “general and abstract
account[s]” (p. 3) reflects Garfinkel’s (1967) call to study particular, everyday activities—those
“unexamined” aspects of a social order. I wonder about Garfinkel’s (1967) hesitation regarding
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theory. I understand that within the practice of theorizing, it is possible to lose sight of the
contingencies of everyday life, or those “unexamined” aspects of social practices. And yet, this
approach seems awfully “all or nothing” to me. Is there not an in-between stage between theory
and no theory?
Carbaugh and Hastings (1992) provide a valuable framework through which practice
theorists might “warm up” to theory. These scholars might find value in the situatedness of
ethnographic theory. For instance, Philipsen’s (1992) work with Teamsterville communicators
does not make a claim for all working class individuals. Nor does Katriel (1986) argue that
Israeli communicators in general communicate in highly direct ways. Rather, they utilize data
from an extended period of time conducting fieldwork to provide a localized theoretical
description of communication. Ethnographic theory can serve as an exemplar for practice
researchers who wish to examine situated scenes of social practices.
Additionally, Hymes (1972) offers a “SPEAKING” heuristic as a guide through which
EOC researchers can focus their ethnographies. Briefly, he argues that ethnographers can
examine the “S”etting or scene, “P”articipants, “E”nds (i.e., “outcomes” and “goals”), “A”ct
sequence (i.e., the “message content” and “ordering” of speech), “K”ey (i.e., the tone in which
something is communicated), “I”nstrumentalities (i.e., channel), “N”orms (of interaction and
interpretation), and “G”enre (e.g., a story, joke, etc.). I present Hymes’ (1972) heuristic as a
means through which practice scholars can engage their research interests, if they wish to move
from their theoretical positions to the more localized contexts in which practices are enacted.
Hence, in line with Philipsen’s (1977) proposal that ethnographers are able to utilize conceptual
frameworks with which to provisionally guide their studies, Hymes’ (1972) heuristic offers one
viable provisional framework option for practice scholars.
In this essay, I explored my curiosity about whether practices and EOC approaches were
more disparate than similar, and whether some sort of “reciprocal enrichment” was possible. I
argued that both share an appreciation for the notion of practice, shared action, and description.
While they are not identical, I offered initial insight as to how each approach might enrich the
other. Using Schatzki (2001a), Barnes (2001), and Turner (2001), and influenced by Carbaugh
and Hastings (1992), I demonstrated how EOC scholars could ask important questions about
their situated theories of communication so as to expand and not debunk them. For example, we
can ask questions pertaining to idiosyncratic communicative behavior and those that inquire
about “ongoing” change within a cultural way of communicating. Additionally, I argued that
EOC scholars offer practice theorists ways in which they might concretize their theoretical
perspectives. Namely, they can situate their theories in localized “scenes” (Carbaugh, 1996) with
rich descriptions of data, and still have a better chance at avoiding “general and abstract
account[s]” (Schatzki, 2001a, p. 3).
My discoveries are initial ones. They are starting points from which I can begin future,
similar analyses between these research approaches to human behavior. I believe that the notion
of theory is central to this, and future investigations. Practice and EOC scholars seem to have
conclusive, often distinct conceptualizations about the ways in which theory should be used and
the ways in which it should be discussed. Considering the title of my essay, I argue that
searching for a “mutually beneficial relationship” between these approaches does not entail, e.g.,
ethnographers using the practice scholars simply as a means of prioritizing ethnography, or viceversa. In spite of the fast-paced times of technological advancement, I have not intended to build
researchers into “bigger, stronger, and quicker machines.” Instead, my sense of “mutuality”
implies that scholars can engage in an ongoing, open minded pursuit of improving themselves
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and their methods with alternative possibilities, while also “giving off” possibilities to other
scholars with differing approaches. Diverse communication researchers can use such
engagement to enact situated communication research and concomitantly and creatively perform
themselves in the process.
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